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QUIS CUSTODIET IPSOS CUSTODES?:*
GUBERNATORIAL AND LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
OF AGENCY RULEMAKING UNDER THE 1981
MODEL ACT
Legislatures frequently delegate broad rulemaking powers to administrative agencies to implement and enforce statutes. I To control the use of
this delegated authority, most states subject agency rulemaking to legislative or executive review. 2 Through the use of various kinds of nonjudicial
review, the states have served as innovative laboratories for the develop3
ment of this concept.
The drafters of the 1961 Model State Administrative Procedure Act
purposely omitted any form of nonjudicial review. 4 Based upon the experiences of the states in the intervening twenty years, however, the draf*

Who guards the guardians?

1. As early as 1911, the United States Supreme Court recognized that "when congress [has]
legislated and indicated its will, it [can] give to those who [are] to act under such general provisions
'power to fill up the details' by the establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the violation
of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment .......
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S.
506, 517 (1911).
Allowing administrative agencies to issue legislative rules having the force of law has become well
accepted in the twentieth century. Most courts hold that substantive rulemaking power must be expressly delegated by the legislature. E.g., Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451 (1952). A few state courts,
however, have found rulemaking power implied in a general delegation of regulatory authority. See
School City of East Chicago v. Sigler, 219 Ind. 9, 36 N.E.2d 760, 762 (1941); H.P. Welch Co. v.
State, 89 N.H. 428, 199 A. 886, 892 (1938), affd, 306 U.S. 79 (1939); O'Connor v. Hendrick, 184
N.Y. 421,77 N.E. 612, 614 (1906).
2. States have used both executive and legislative personnel to advise agencies, recommend legislation, hold public hearings, suspend or annul rules, bring legal actions to contest rules, and reverse
the presumption of a rule's validity upon judicial review. See Levinson, Legislative and Executive
Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 79
(1982) (surveying executive and legislative review mechanisms) (written by one of two Reporters for
the 1981 Model Administrative Procedure Act). In addition to these procedural mechanisms, legislatures possess several means of affecting agency action. A state legislature can revoke agency rules
with legislation. See generally Kaiser, CongressionalAction to OverturnAgency Rules: Alternatives
to the "Legislative Veto," 32 AD. L. REv. 667 (1980) (surveying statutory methods of modifying
and rescinding agency rules). A state legislature can also influence agency rulemaking indirectly by
exercising its authority over appropriations and investigations, or by using its power to block appointments. See generallyW. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAuss, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENrs 104-16 (7th ed. 1979) (surveying informal legislative controls).
3. Justice Brandeis recognized the virtues of federalism for the nation's legal and social development in his famous phrase: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4. The drafters omitted external review because the procedures were then new and relatively
untested. See I F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 221 (1965).
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ters of the 1981 Model Act 5 ("the Act") incorporated optional provisions

for two kinds of external review: executive and legislative. Given the
great popularity of the 1946 and 1961 Model Acts, 6 the inclusion of external review provisions in the 1981 Act will likely legitimize this controver7
sial practice and spur adoption of similar provisions by the states.
This Comment first outlines the history of nonjudicial review of agency
rulemaking. It then describes and evaluates the gubernatorial and legislative review provisions of the 1981 Model Act. Finally, drawing upon the

experiences of several states, it proposes a modification of the Act's approach to nonjudicial review. The proposed approach limits the scope of
advisory review and minimizes the potential for abuse.
1. BACKGROUND
Executive and legislative bodies have subjected administrative rule-

making to review and rescission for thousands of years. Perhaps the first
recorded use of this practice occurred in Ancient Rome when the tribunes
of the plebeians received a veto power over the magisterial acts of public
officials shortly after they organized in 494 B.C. 8 Legislative review, the

most common form of external control, derives from a longstanding British practice. 9 In Great Britain, proposed administrative rules are laid before Parliament and are subject to its veto. 10 Many commentators believe
that this procedure has resulted in more careful administrative action and

5.

MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1981)

[hereinafter cited as 1981 MODEL

ACT].
6. At least 34 states and the District of Columbia have administrative procedure acts based in part
on the 1946 and 1961 Model Acts. They include: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia.
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland. Massachusetts, Michigan. Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraksa, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico. New York. North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont. Washington. West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. prefatory note at 5 n.l (citing 14 U.L.A. 357 (master ed.
1980): 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1:10 at 36-37 (2d ed. 1978)).
7. At least one state, North Dakota, has already adopted the reversed burden of persuasion mechanism. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-03.3 (Supp. 1981); see text accompanying notes 78-84 infra.
8.

See H. JOLOWICZ & B. NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW

12 (3d ed. 1972); H. WOLFF, ROMAN LAW: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 10 (1951).

9. The British practice of parliamentary review of administrative rulemaking dates from an 1833
statute requiring that proposed judicial rules be laid before Parliament six weeks before they took
effect. See Carr, Legislative Control of AdministrativeRules and Regulations: Parliamientary Supervision in Britain, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1955).

10. Id. The British practice of "laying over" rules before Parliament employs two alternative
procedures. Under the negative procedure, the most common method, a proposed rule becomes effective unless annulled by Parliament within a stated period. Under the affirmative procedure. the
proposed rule is not effective unless approved by Parliament. Id. at 1046-47.

Review of Agency Rulemaking
in better rulemaking. I1In the United States, the federal and state governments have experimented with both executive and legislative review.
A.

Executive Review

Many states have adopted provisions enabling members of the executive branch to review agency rules. In six states the governor is either
required to approve' 2 or authorized to veto 13 proposed agency rules. In
fifteen states the attorney general examines proposed rules to determine
their legality. 14 California recently created an independent agency to review all agency rules, the Office of Administrative Law (" OAL"). 15 It is
empowered to disapprove rules, 16 but its disapproval is subject to veto by
the governor. 17 The OAL is the most ambitious rule review program in
the states, 18 and it incorporates characteristics of both judicial and legisla11. See GELLHORN, BYSE & STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 117; Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and
the Constitution-A Reexamination,46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 351, 360 (1978).
12. HAWAll REV. STAT. § 91-3(c) (Supp. 1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-22-2-5 (Bums 1982);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-908 (Supp. 1980); Wyo. STAT. § 9-4-103(d) (1977).
13. IOWA CODE § 17A.4.6 (Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:970 (West Supp. 1982);
Wyo. STAT. § 28-9-106(b) (1977).
14. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1002.01 (Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(8)
(Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-169 (Supp. 1981); IND. CODEANN. § 4-22-2-5 (Bums 1982);
IOWA CODE § 17A.4.4 (1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-420(b) (1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §
8056(1)(A) (Supp. 1981); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 3.560(145)(1) (Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. §
15.0412(4e) (Supp. 1982); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-905.01 (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-12(b)
(1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-02 (Supp. 1981); 45 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1205 (Purdon
Supp. 1981) (review by dept. of justice); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 1-26-6.5 (1980); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 4-5-104(h)(1) (Supp. 1981).
Some commentators have criticized review by the attorney general as one-sided, brief, and superficial. See Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative ProcedureAct: Background, Construction, Applicability,
PublicAccess To Agency Law, The Rulemaking Process, 60 IowA L. REV. 731, 898 (1975); 1 F.
COOPER, supra note 4, at 220. The attorney general's office may lack the time and resources to
review many rules closely. Because assistant attorneys general often write agency rules, approval
may be perfunctory. In addition, this method of review does not address such problems as undesirable legal rules or existing illegal rules. It also fails to provide the legislature and executive with the
information necessary to supervise the agencies' exercise of delegated authority.
15. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11340 (West 1980).
16. Id. § 11349.3.
17. Id. § 11349.5.
18. The OAL is the best financed and the most active reviewing body in the states. The legislature appropriated $1.4 million for the OAL's first-year operating budget and another $2.1 million to
defer the compliance costs of state agencies. As of March 1981, the OAL had a staff of 26, including
seven attorneys. It is authorized to employ a staff of 40. M. PRICE, EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF RULEMAKING: THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CALIFORNIA, REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFER-

ENCE OFTHE UNITED STATES 22-24 (March, 1981) [hereinafter cited as PRICE]. During its first year of
operation, July 1980 to June 1981, the OAL disapproved 27% of all proposed rules, including 37% of
proposed "emergency" rules. It also initiated a plan for state agencies to review 30,000 pages of
existing regulations by December 31, 1982. OFFICE OF AMrINIsTRATIvE LAW, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT
1980-81 4, 8-9 [hereinafter cited as OAL REPORT].
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tive review. 19 No comparable procedures for formal review by an execu20
tive body exist at the federal level.

B.

Legislative Review
During the past fifty years, Congress has occasionally included in stat-

The OAL also has had the greatest apparent impact on agency rulemaking. California agencies
proposed 32% fewer sets of rules during the first year of review. Id. at 4. This dramatic decrease in
rulemaking is not necessarily advantageous. It may represent unfulfilled legislative mandates or a
shift to less accountable and efficient policy making by adjudication.
19. OAL review is similar to judicial review in several ways. The scope of OAL review is limited by statute to the rulemaking file. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11349.1 (West 1979). Although the staff
may contact the parties for elaboration if the file is unclear or overly technical, OAL policy prohibits
the introduction of new information without another hearing. PRICE, supra note 18. at 25. The OAL
is also required to defer to agency expertise. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11340.1 (West 1980).
OAL procedure also incorporates several attributes of legislative review that differ markedly from
judicial review. The OAL expeditiously and systematically reviews all proposed rules. The broad
standards for review include "necessity" and "consistency." Id. § 11349. l(al-(d). These involve
policy questions normally outside judicial scrutiny. The OAL has the capacity to provide agencies
with guidance and advice before a rule is adopted. PRICE, supra note 18, at 15. Finally, the OAL
issues regular reports to the legislature and provides analysis, recommendations, and testimony on
proposed bills. OAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 11.
20. Although there are no analogous formal federal procedures, there has been continued interest
in vesting ultimate administrative control in the President. Early proposals include the 1937 Brownlow Report. US. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT. ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1937) (recommending reorganization of
the executive branch to allow the President to organize and coordinate policy). A 1949 bill would
have authorized the President to supervise executive agencies in their performance of delegated duties. General Management Act. S. 942, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). More recently, the ABA Commission on Law and the Economy urged enactment of a statute authorizing the President to modify or
revoke "'critical regulations." See ABA COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM 79-84 (Final Report, 1979). The Commission's proposal was incorporated

in the Accountability in Regulatory Rulemaking Act of 1979. S. 1545, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1979).
None of these proposals have been adopted, however.
Recent Presidents have achieved some success in directing agency rulemaking by executive order.
Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan have all issued executive orders that constrain agency rulemaking. The most recent of these is Executive Order 12,291 requiring the application of cost-benefit
analysis to certain proposed rules. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). Although these
measures do not enable the President to modify or rescind specific rules, they do allow for general
control over the rulemaking process. The constitutionality of Executive Order 12,291 has been questioned by recent commentators. See Edelman, Reagan's Attempt to Control the Federal Administrative Process is Unconstitutional, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 646 (1981); Rosenberg. Beyond the Limits
of Executive Power: PresidentialControl ofAgency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80
MICH. L. REV. 193, 195-234 (1981).
The Carter Administration created two intra-agency coordinating bodies, a Regulatory Counsel
and a Regulatory Analysis Group, to screen and analyze proposed rules. These groups have advisory
authority only, and their critical analysis is disclosed to the public. See Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex ParteContactsby the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943. 948-49 (1980).
The President can influence agency rulemaking by the exercise of executive powers. These include
the power to appoint and remove executive agency officials, to define governmental goals. and to
control administrative requests to Congress. See GELLHORN, BYSE & STRAUSS, supra note 2. at
126-41.
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utes legislative veto provisions. These provisions enable Congress to review agency rules that implement the statutes and allow it to annul them
by resolution. 2 1 In recent years, inclusion of veto provisions in legislation
has increased dramatically. 22 Although the Federal Administrative Procedure Act purposely omitted legislative review, 23 uniform legislative review has been proposed repeatedly in recent legislation. 24
Formal legislative review is more common at the state level. Led by
Kansas in 1939, 25 thirty-eight states have adopted procedures for legislative review of agency rules. 26 Twenty-two states have created special leg21. This includes the power to block or delay proposed regulations by simple resolution, e.g.,
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, § 104, 88 Stat. 1695,
1697 (1974); by concurrent resolution, e.g., Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of
1974, 15 U.S.C. § 1910(b) (1976); and by committee objection, e.g., Education Amendments of
1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). See generally Watson, CongressSteps Out: A Look
at CongressionalControl of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 1089-95 (1975) (a partial listing
of statutes that authorize congressional and/or committee action).
22. A legislative veto was first incorporated in the executive reorganization provisions of the
Legislative Appropriation Act of 1932, Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314, § 407, 47 Stat. 414. By 1982,
legislative vetoes had been included at least 272 times in 193 different acts of Congress. In 1980
alone, Congress passed 17 acts containing 38 veto provisions. See Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 225
(citing Norton, Statistical Summary of Congressional Approval and Disapproval Legislation,
1932-1982 (CRS, Sept. 13, 1981)).
23. The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure reported that it did "not
recommend a general requirement that regulations be laid before Congress before going into effect.
Legislative review of administrative regulations . . . has not been effective where tried." ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITrEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 120 (1941).
24. E.g., H.R. 3740, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1776, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981); S.
890, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981); S. 382, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1776, 96th Cong. 1st.
Sess. (1979); H.R. 601, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 512, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979).
25. 1939 KAN. SESs. LAWS ch. 308.
26. ALA. CODE §§ 41-22-22, -24. (Supp. 1981); ALASKA STAT. § 24.20.400 (1978) and §
44.62.320 (1980) (held unconstitutional in State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska
1980)); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-511.05 (Supp. 1981) (rules of state parks board only); ARK.
STAT, ANN. § 6-608 (Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(d) (Supp. 1981) (amended 1982);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4-170,-171 (Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. § 120.545 (Supp. 1974-81); GA. CODE
§ 3A-104(e)-(g) (Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-5217, -5218 (Supp. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
127, § 1007.02 (1981); IOWA CODE §§ 17A.4(4), .4(5), .8 (1978 & Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
77-426 (Supp. 1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.087 (Baldwin 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
49:968, :969 (West Supp. 1982); MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. art. 40, § 40A (Supp. 1981); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 3.560(145) (Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. § 3.965 (Supp. 1982); Mo. REV. STAT. §
536.037 (Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-4-401, -402 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
84-908.02, -909 (Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 233B.067, .0675 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 541-A:3(I) (Supp. 1981); N.Y. LEGIS. LAW art. 5-B, §§ 86-88 (McKinney Supp. 1981);
N.C. GEN. STAT. 120-30.26 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 54-35-02.6, 28-32-03.3 (Supp.
1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.35 (Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. tit. 75, § 308 (Supp. 1981); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 171.572, 183.720 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-120, -125 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1981); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 1-26-1.1, -38 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-104(h) (Supp.
1981); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13(g) (Vernon Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §

817 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.210 (1981); W. VA. CODE §§ 29A-3-1 1, -12 (1980)
(held unconstitutional in Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981)); Wis. STAT. § 227.018
(Supp. 1981); Wyo. STAT. §§ 28-9-101,-108 (1977).
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islative rule review committees, 27 and eighteen states allow the legislature to veto a rule by resolution of one 28 or both 29 houses.
Although many states have authorized their review committees only to
advise agencies and to recommend amendments to the legislature, an increasing number grant additional powers. 30 In some states, the committee
may suspend rules pending consideration of statutory repeal. 3' In other
states, the committee may annul rules, subject to reversal by the legislature. 32 Several states authorize the committee to publish a formal objecIn Massachusetts. several legislative bodies review agency rules without statutory authority. They
rely upon the legislature's implied constitutional power of investigation. N.Y. SENATE RESEARCH
SERVICE, TASK FORCE ON CRITICAL PROBLEMS, ADMINISTRATIVE RULES: WHAT ISTHE LEGISLATURE'S
ROLE? 10 (June, 1976) [hereinafer cited as N.Y. STUDY].

27.

ALA. CODE § 41-22-22 (Supp. 1981); ALASKA STAT § 24.20.400 (1978); CONN GEN STAT

§ 4-170 (Supp. 1981); ILL. REV- STAT ch. 127, § 1007.02 (1981): IOWA CODE § 17A.8 (1978): KAN

STAT ANN. § 77-436 (Supp. 1981); KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 13.087 (Baldwin 1981): MD STATE
GOVT CODE ANN art. 40, § 40A (Supp. 1981); MICH. STAT ANN § 3.560(135) (Supp. 1981): MINN
STAT. § 3.965 (Supp. 1982); Mo REV STAT. § 536.037 (Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN §§
2-4-401. 5-14-101 (1981); NEB REV STAT. § 84-901.01 (Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT §
120-30.26 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-35-02.5 (Supp. 1981); N.Y. LEGis LAW art.
5-B, § 86 (McKinney Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 101.35 (Supp. 1981); S.D. CotP LAWS
ANN. § 1-26-1.1 (1980); VT.STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 817 (Supp. 1981); WASH REV CODE § 34.04.210

(1981); W. VA CODE § 29A-3-1 1(1980); Wis STAT. § 13.56 (Supp. 1981).
A number of states delegate this responsibility to the legislative counsel or to an analogous body.
e.g., OR REV- STAT. § 171.707 (1981); Wyo. STAT. § 28-9-102 (1977).
28. OKLA STAT tit.
75, § 308(b) (Supp. 1981).

29.

ALA CODE § 41-22-23(b) (Supp. 1981) (affirming committee suspension): ALASKA STAT §

44.62.320 (1980) (held unconstitutional in State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska
1980)); ARIZ REV STAT ANN § 41-511.05(8) (Supp. 1975-81) (rules of state park board only):
CONN GEN STAT § 4-171 (Supp. 1981) (affirming committee disapproval): GA. CODE § 3A- 104(f)
(Supp. 1981) (subject to gubernatorial veto if less than two-thirds majority); IDAHO CODE § 67-5218
(Supp. 1981); ILL, REV STAT. ch. 127, § 1007.07a(c) (1981); IOWA CODE § 17A.8(9) (Supp. 1981)
(subject to gubernatorial veto); KAN STAT. ANN- § 77-426(d) (Supp. 1981): KY REV STAT ANN §
13.087(9) (Baldwin 1981); LA REV STAT ANN. § 49:969 (West Supp. 1982): MONT CODE ANN §
2-4-412(2) (1981): NEV. REV STAT § 233B.0675(3) (1981); OHIO REV CODE ANN § 119.03()
(Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE ANN § 1-23-120 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981): VT STAT. ANN tit. 3. § 817
(Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 29A-3-12 (1980) (held unconstitutional in Barker v. Manchin. 279

S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981)).
30. In 1977 the National Conference of State Legislatures recommended that
states
adopt procedures for legislative review of administrative regulations "as strong as the constitution of each state
allows." LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION COMMITTEE. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES. LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS 4 2d draft (June 11,
1977), quoted in Schwartz, supra note 11, at 361. In response, a number of states have delegated
additional powers to the review committee. For example, in 1975 one commentator counted only four
states that authorized the committee to suspend or veto a rule. Bonfield, supra note 14, at 899. By
May 1982, this number had grown to 16. See notes 31-32 and accompanying text infra.

31. ALA CODE § 41-22-23(b) (Supp. 1981); ALASKA STAT. § 24.20.445 (1978); ILL REV
STAT. ch. 127, § 1007.06(a) (1981); IOWA CODE § 17A.4(5) (Supp. 1981); MINN STAT § 3.965
(Supp. 1982); NEB. REV STAT § 84-908.03 (Supp. 1980); NEV. REV STAT § 233B.0675 (1981):
OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 119.03(l) (Supp. 1981); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 1-26-38 (1980); WIS
STAT § 227.018 (Supp. 1981).

32. ALA- CODE § 41-22-23(b) (Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT § 4-170(c) (Supp. 1981); LA

Review of Agency Rulemaking
tion to any agency rule. 33 In five states, this objection reverses the usual
judicial presumption of a rule's validity. 34 A few states authorize the
committee to bring a legal action to contest the validity of a proposed
rule.

35

C. The CurrentControversyOver NonjudicialReview
Recent experimentation with executive and legislative review reflects
increasing public, political, and scholarly dissatisfaction with the regulatory process. Nonjudicial review is only one of a range of reforms proposed for administrative rulemaking. 36 There are several reasons for this
dissatisfaction. First, deferential judicial review has given agencies broad
discretion in the use of delegated power. 37 Second, administrative independence from the political process is thought to isolate agencies, which
reduces their public accountability. 38 Third, agency regulatory activity
can affect the economy adversely by protecting inefficiency, deterring innovation, and hindering business. 39 To obviate these problems, many
REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:968(G) (West Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 3.560(145) (Supp. 1981);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-30.28(0 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-104(h) (Supp. 1981); W.
VA. CODE § 29A-3-1 l(b) (1980) (held unconstitutional in Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W.
Va. 1981)).
33. FLA. STAT. § 120.545(8) (Supp. 1974-81); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1007.06(a) (1981);
IOWA CODE § 17A.4(4) (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-03.3 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3,
§ 842(b) (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.240(2) (1981).
34. IOWA CODE § 17A.4(4)(a) (Supp. 1981); MoNr. CODE ANN. § 2-4-566(3) (1981); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 120-30.28, .29A(b) (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENr. CODE § 28-32-03.3 (Supp. 1981);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 842 (Supp. 1981).
35. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 11.60(2)0) (Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-402(3)(c) (1981);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-30.29A (Supp. 1982).
36. These reforms include deregulation, cost-benefit analysis of rules, periodic intra-agency review, more intensive judicial review, and sunset provisions that limit an agency's lifespan unless the
legislature revives the agency's authority. Some of these are incorporated in the 1981 Model Act. See
1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 5, at §§ 3-105, -201 (cost-benefit analysis and intra-agency review).
Others are the subject of recent scholarly commentary. E.g., Adams, Sunset: A Proposalfor Accountable Government, 28 AD. L. REv. 511 (1976). Still others are the subject of proposed federal
legislation. E.g., S. 67, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981) (the "Bumpers Amendment," mandating de
novo judicial review of "all relevant questions of law" regarding agency activity).
37. The traditional guide for judicial review of formal agency rulemaking was set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186
(1935): "[W]here the regulation is within the scope of authority legally delegated, the presumption of
the existence of facts justifying its specific exercise attaches alike to statutes, to municipal ordinances, and to orders of administrative bodies." Simply stated, rules within an agency's delegated
authority are presumptively valid. In recent years, however, courts have subjected agency rules to
more intensive judicial review. See K. DAvis. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§ 29.01,
.01--1 to-4 (1976).
38.

See J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN

GOVERNMENT 259-66 (1978).
39. Overzealous regulatory activity may affect state economies by deterring industry from locat-
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commentators advocate legislative and executive review to return
lawmaking power to the legislature, 40 increase administrative accountability, 4 1 and eliminate unnecessary regulation. 42 They believe that nonjudicial review can ensure that agency rules are lawful 43 and can coordinate
agency activity to prevent conflicts between the rules of different agencies
44
or between regulatory activity and legislative intent.
Despite these apparent benefits, other commentators believe that a rigorous system of nonjudicial review is unwise. 45 They claim that it will
increase the power of key legislative staff,46 and will politicize agencies

by encouraging interference by powerful legislators and influential lobbyists. 47 They also believe that it will decrease administrative efficiency by

duplicating judicial review, by allowing unqualified generalists to disreing there and causing domestic industries to relocate. The cancellation of two proposed industrial
projects, ostensibly due to government regulation, was a precipitating factor in the creation of the
California OAL. See PRICE, supra note 18, at I.
40. See J. LANDIS. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 77-79 (1938). Bonfield, supra note 14, at 897.
Legislative review not only allows the legislature to control directly agencies' exercise of delegated
lawmaking authority, but also alerts the legislature to new rules, unclear statutes, and unforeseen
situations. Ideally, this will make agency policy more consistent with legislative intent and public
preferences.
41. See Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395. 1408-09
(1975). Proponents claim that review by elected bodies will increase administrative accountability in
two ways. First, it will make agencies indirectly accountable to the voting public. Theoretically. the
electoral significance of this issue to the officials will cause them to ensure that agency rulemaking is
consistent with the public's preferred objectives. But see note 98 infra. Second, review places political responsibility for agency rulemaking on the legislature or executive. This should cause them to
assume a more active role in the administrative process.
42. Cutler & Johnson, supra note 41, at 1395-97. Cutler and Johnson claim that the lack of
public accountability leads indirectly to over-regulation. They claim that legislatures currently delegate broad rulemaking powers to administrative agencies to avoid the politically dangerous task of
allocating scarce resources among competing interests. Id. at 1400. Theoretically, legislative review
would not only reverse this process, but would enable the legislature to rescind directly burdensome
or unnecessary regulations. This would make nonjudicial review a moderate alternative to more extreme remedies such as sunset provisions and deregulation.
43. See. e.g.. Bonfield, supra note 14, at 896-97. Legislative and executive review have three
potential advantages over judicial review. First, they provide systematic review of all rules, rather
than only those brought before the courts. Second, they protect the public from improper agency
rulemaking at no cost to the affected individuals. Third, unlike the courts, executive and legislative
bodies can modify or correct improper rules as well as invalidate them.
44. See. e.g.. Cutler & Johnson, supra note 41, at 1411.
45. See. e.g.. Bonfield, supra note 14, at 897-98: Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers:The Executive on a Leash?, 56 N.C.L. REV. 423 (1978); Bruff & Gellhom. Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369
(1977) (based on a report prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States):
McGowan, Congress, Court. and Control of Delegated Power. 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119. 1133-62
(1977) (criticizing legislative vetoes); Comment, Delegation and Regulatory Reforn: Letting the
President Change the Rules. 89 YALE L.J. 561 (1980).
46. See. e.g.. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 45, at 1417-20.
47. See. e.g.. Bonfield, supra note 14, at 897: Bruff & Gellhom. supra note 45, at 1412-14:
Dixon. supra note 45, at 445-48.
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gard agency expertise, and by delaying the rulemaking process.4 8 They
predict that this will cause agencies to resort to adjudication, 49 which they
view as a less desirable way to make policy. 50 Although this debate over
nonjudicial review has occurred primarily at the federal level, these arguments apply with equal force to the states.
Because of this debate, the Uniform Commissioners incorporated optional provisions for gubernatorial and legislative review in the 1981
Model State Administrative Procedure Act. 5 1 These provisions are intended to remedy the problems of unchecked agency activity while avoiding the defects of more rigorous and intrusive review systems.
II.

NONJUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE 1981 MODEL ACT

The 1981 Model Act includes two optional methods for subjecting
agency rulemaking to nonjudicial review. The first enables the governor
to review and veto agency rules;52 the second provides for a special legis48. See, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 14, at 897; Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 45, at 1414-17;
McGowan, supranote 45, at 1147-48.
49. See, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 14, at 898; Bruff& Gellhom, supranote 45, at 1425; Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L.
REv. 169, 210 n.95 (1978).
50. Adjudication is increasingly considered an inappropriate method for formulating important
policies. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATisE § 6:38 (2d ed. 1978). Davis believes that
the current rulemaking procedure is superior to adjudication in six ways: (1) it provides systematic
notification to interested persons; (2) notice and comment proceedings inform the agency of the views
of persons unrepresented in an adjudication; (3) adjudication allows the creation of policy that affects
unrepresented persons; (4) rulemaking allows the agency to consult all interested persons; (5) rulemaking is usually prospective; (6) the legislature may influence rulemaking but not adjudications.
Id. at 625; see also Kahn, The NLRB and HigherEducation:The Failure of Policymaking Through
Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 63 (1973) (describing problems caused by case-by-case decision-making in the NLRB's application of National Labor Relations Act guidelines to universities
and colleges).
51. Because it is a "model" act, all sections and provisions are optional. See 1981 MODEL Acr,
supra note 5, prefatory note at 4 (each state should adopt only "as much of the act as is helpful in its
particular circumstances"). Certain sections, provisions, and phrases are enclosed in brackets to denote that they are expressly optional. These include the gubernatorial and legislative review sections.
52. [SECTION 3-202. [Gubernatorial Review of Rules; Administrative Rules Counsel.]
(a) To the extent the agency itself would have authority, the governor may rescind or suspend
all or a severable portion of a rule of an agency. In exercising this authority, the governor shall
act by an executive order that is subject to the requirements applicable to the adoption and effectiveness of a rule.
(b) The governor may summarily terminate any pending rule-making proceeding by an executive order to that effect, stating therein the reasons for the action. The executive order must be
filed in the office of the [secretary of state], which shall promptly forward a certified copy to the
agency and the [administrative rules editor]. An executive order terminating a rule-making proceeding becomes effective on [the date it is filed] and must be published in the next issue of the
[administrative bulletin].
(c) Within the office of the governor, there shall be an [administrative rules counsel] to advise

Washington Law Review

Vol. 57:669, 1982

lative review committee 53 to advise agencies and the legislature and to
54
reverse the usual judicial presumption of a rule's validity.
the governor in the execution of the authority vested under this Article. The [administrative rules
counsel] shall be appointed by the governor and shall serve at the pleasure of the governor.]
1981 MODEL AcT. supra note 5, § 3-202 (brackets denote optional section or provision) (based on
IOWA CODE § 17A.4(6) (Supp. 1981)).
53. [SECTION 3-203. [Administrative Rules Review Committee.]
There is created the ["administrative rules review committee"] of the legislature. The committee shall be [bipartisan]: and shall be composed of 13] senators appointed by the [president of
the senate] and [3] representatives appointed by the [speaker of the house]. A committee member shall be appointed within [301 days after the convening of a regular session. The term of
office shall be for [2] years while a member of the legislature beginning on the date of appointment to the committee. However, while a member of the legislature, a member of the committee
whose term has expired shall serve until a successor is appointed. A vacancy on the committee
may be filled at any time by the original appointing authority for the remainder of the term. The
committee shall choose a chairperson from its membership for a [2] year term and may employ
such staff as it deems advisable.]
1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 5, § 3-203 (brackets denote optional section or provision) (based on
IOwA CODE § 17A.8(1), (2), (8) (1978)).
54. SECTION 3-204. [Administrative Rules Review Committee Review of Rules.I
(a) The [administrative rules review committee] shall selectively review possible. proposed.
or adopted rules, and prescribe appropriate committee procedures for that purpose. The committee may receive and investigate complaints from members of the public with respect to possible,
proposed, or adopted rules, and hold public proceedings thereon.
(b) Committee meetings must be open to the public. Subject to procedures established by the
committee, persons may present oral argument, data, or views at those meetings. The committee
may require a representative of an agency whose possible, proposed, or adopted rule is under
examination to attend a committee meeting and answer relevant questions. The committee may
also communicate to the agency its comments on any possible or proposed rule, and require the
agency to respond thereto in writing. Unless impracticable, in advance of each committee meeting notice of the time and place of the meeting and the specific subject matter to be considered
must be published in the [administrative bulletin].
(c) The committee may recommend enactment of a statute to improve the operation of one or
more agencies. The committee may also recommend that a particular rule be superseded in
whole or in part by statute. The [speaker of the house and the president of the senate] shall refer
those recommendations to the appropriate standing committees. This subsection does not preclude any committee of the legislature from reviewing a rule on its own motion or recommending that it be superseded in whole or in part by statute.
[(d)(l) If the commmittee objects to all or some portion of a rule because the committee
deems it to be beyond the procedural or substantive authority delegated to the adopting agency,
the committee may file that objection in the office of the [secretary of state]. The filed objection
must contain a concise statement of the committee's reasons for its action.
(2) The [secretary of state] shall affix to each objection a certification of the time and date of
its filing and as soon thereafter as possible shall transmit a certified copy thereof to the agency
issuing the rule in question, the [administrative rules editor, and the administrative rules counsel]. The [secretary of state] shall also maintain a permanent register open to public inspection of
all committee objections.
(3) The [administrative rules editor] shall publish and index an objection filed pursuant to this
subsection in the next issue of the [administrative bulletin] and indicate its existence adjacent to
the rule in question when that rule is published in the [administrative code]. In case of a filed
committee objection to a rule subject to the requirements of Section 2 -101(g), the agency shall
indicate the existence of that objection adjacent to the rule in the official compilation referred to
in that subsection.
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A.

GubernatorialReview

The 1981 Model Act's gubernatorial review provision allows the governor to veto all or severable portions of present and proposed agency
rules. Unlike some state administrative procedure acts, 55 the Act does not
mandate gubernatorial review of every proposed agency rule. A proposed
rule becomes effective unless the governor elects to veto it. The veto is
not restricted by specific statutory criteria or by a limited time period, 56
but is subject to some procedural requirements. When a governor vetoes a
proposed agency rule, 57 the governor must issue an executive order stating the reasons for the veto. 58 When a governor rescinds or suspends an
existing agency rule, 59 the governor must follow the same procedural re-

quirements that an agency must follow in its rulemaking. 60

(4) Within [14] days after the filing of a committee objection to a rule, the issuing agency shall
respond in writing to the committee. After receipt of the response, the committee may withdraw
or modify its objection.
[(5) After the filing of a committee objection that is not subsequently withdrawn, the burden is
upon the agency in any action for judicial review or for enforcement of the rule to establish that
the whole or portion thereof objected to is within the procedural and substantive authority delegated to the agency.]
(6) The failure of the [administrative rules review committee] to object to a rule is not an
implied legislative authorization of its procedural or substantive validity.]
(e)
The committee may recommend to an agency that it adopt a rule. [The committee may also
require an agency to publish notice of a committee recommendation as a proposed rule of the
agency and allow public participation thereon, according to the provisions of Sections 3-103
through 3-104. After those proceedings, however, an agency is not required to adopt such a
proposed rule.]
(f)
The committee shall file an annual report with the [presiding officer] of each house and the
governor.
1981 MODEL Act, supra note 5, § 3-204 (brackets denote optional section or provision) (based on
IOWA CODE § 17A.8(6), (8) (1978) and NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 84-908, -908.01 (1976)).
One of the drafters of the 1981 Model Act is Professor Bonfield, and the comments to this section
of the Act refer to Bonfield's article on the analogous Iowa provisions. See Bonfield, supra note 14.
This Comment will therefore refer to the Bonfield article to explain the effect and rationale behind the
legislative review provision.
55. See note 12supra.
56. 1981 MODEL Acr, supra note 5, § 3-202 comments (governor can veto rules "for any reason and at any time").
57. The governor receives advance notice of proposed rules along with the rest of the public
when their terms are published in the state administrative bulletin before the period for public comment as required by § 3-103. The governor then has 30 days to act before the rule can be adopted. By
making the initial gubernatorial review concurrent with the period for public comment, the drafters
avoid unnecessary delay in the rulemaking process. Once a rule is adopted, the governor must use the
alternate procedure for rescinding existing agency rules, whether or not the rule has yet become
effective. Id. § 3-202.
58. Id. § 3-202(b).
59. The governor receives two notices of most adopted rules, because the Act requires republication of an adopted rule in the administrative bulletin and requires the transmittal of copies to the
administrative counsel and legislative review committee. Id. §§ 3-103, -114.
60. Id. § 3-202(a). The procedural requirements would include publication in the administrative
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The veto is intended to control legal but politically unacceptable
agency rulemaking, to centralize political responsibility, and to coordinate regulatory activity. 6 1 In effect, it allows the directly elected governor
to supersede unelected agency officials by terminating agency proceedings and suspending or rescinding agency rules. To assist the governor in
the exercise of this power, the Act creates a special executive officer, the
62
administrative rules counsel.

B.

LegislativeReview

The 1981 Model Act also provides for creation of a bicameral legislative committee to review agency rulemaking. 63 The committee is authorized to "selectively review" possible, proposed, and existing agency
rules and to investigate public complaints. 64 It is required to promulgate

"appropriate committee procedures" for this review process, 65 and must

report yearly to the legislature.

66

Unlike many state acts, 67 the Model Act

does not require that agencies notify the committee of proposed or
adopted rules, and it does not provide additional time apart from the pub68
lic notice and comment period for committee review.
bulletin, inclusion in the rulemaking docket, acceptance of public comment for 30 days. possible oral
proceedings or regulatory analysis, republication of the order with a concise explanatory statement.
and compilation of a rulemaking record. Id. §§ 3-102 to 3-112. The governor could perhaps evade
some of these requirements by using the Act's exemption provisions. See note 110 and accompanying
text infra.
61. 1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 5. § 3-202 comments.
62. Id. § 3-202(c). The counsel is appointed by the governor and serves at the governor's pleasure. Id. Larger states may wish to create a special staff for this purpose.
63. Id. § 3-203. The "administrative rules review committee" is composed of three senators
and three representatives. The members serve two year terms and the committee is authorized to
employ its own staff. Id.
64. Id. § 3-204(a).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 3-204(0.
67. See, e.g., MICH. CostP. LAWS § 3.560(145) (Supp. 1981) (additional 60 day review period):
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-120 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981) (additional 90 day review period): W. VA.
CODE § 29A-3-11 (1980) (additional 180 day review period) (held unconstitutional in Barker v.
Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981)).
68. This avoids unnecessary delay in the promulgation of rules. It is consistent with the Act's
goal of "assur[ing] a fair balance between the urgent need for efficient, economical, and effective
government on the one hand, and a responsible administrative process in which persons may adequately protect their interests against improper or unwise government action on the other." 1981
MODEL ACT, supra note 5, prefatory note at 4. The committee receives initial notice of a proposed
rule when it is published in the administrative bulletin before the period for public comment. Thereafter, the agency must wait 30 days before adopting the rule. The committee also receives two additional notices of all adopted rules. Id. §§ 3-103, -114; see note 59 supra. After the rule is adopted
and filed it is not effective for an additional 30 days. Hence. the committee will have 60 days to
review most proposed rules. See Bonfield, supra note 14. at 906-07.
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The Act provides for public participation in the committee's review
process. The public is authorized to attend committee meetings and present views orally or in writing. 69 To ensure agency participation, the
committee can compel agency representatives to attend its meetings, answer questions, and respond to communications in writing. 70 These provisions for public and agency participation are intended to apprise committee members of all matters of fact or policy relevant to the rules under
7
consideration. '
The committee's formal powers are limited to advising agencies and to
referring rules to the legislature. 72 It may advise agencies on possible or
proposed rules. 73 It may also recommend that an agency adopt, amend, or
repeal a rule. 74 Alternatively, the committee may recommend to the legislature that it enact a statute to supersede undesirable rules or to alter
agency powers. 75 There are no standards for this advisory review. 76 Unlike the governor, neither the committee nor the legislature can suspend
or veto agency rules.
The Act includes two optional provisions for states that wish to vest
their committees with more than purely advisory authority. The first authorizes the committee in limited circumstances to file a formal objection
to a rule. 77 This objection shifts the burden of establishing the statutory
and procedural authority for a challenged rule to the agency during judicial review. 78 In effect, this reverses the usual judicial presumption of a
rule's validity. The committee may file an objection, however, only if the
rule is "beyond the procedural or substantive authority delegated to the
adopting agency," and it must include a brief statement of the commit69. 1981 MODEL Acr, supranote 5, § 3-204(b). To facilitate public participation, the committee is required to publish advance notice of the time, place, and subject of meetings in the administrative bulletin unless this would be "impracticable." Id.
70. Id.
71. Bonfield, supra note 14, at 903. Committee meetings are likely to resemble informal legislative hearings or, as one participant has described them, "New England style town meetings." Letter
from Joseph A. Royce, Iowa Administrative Rules Review Committee Staff, to author (Dec. 29,
1981) (on file with the Washington Law Review) [herinafter cited as Royce letter].
72. The Act's drafters expressly omit a committee suspension and legislative veto:
[Section 3-204(c)] provides that a lawful rule may only be legislatively overcome or altered by
statute. That is, legislative suspension or repeal of a particular agency rule, in whole or in part,
should ultimately be determined only by joint legislative action subject to the veto of the governor of the state or the overriding of a veto.
1981 MODEL Acr, supra note 5, § 3-204 comments.
73. Id. § 3-204(b).
74. Id. § 3-204(e).
75. Id. § 3-204(c).
76. The committee may advise agencies and refer rules to the legislature because of the substance
of the rule as well as its legality. Bonfield, supranote 14, at 904.
77. 1981 MODEL Acr, supranote 5, § 3-204(d).
78. Id.
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tee's reasons for objecting. 79 If the objection is not withdrawn after the
agency's response, 80 it is published in the state's administrative bulletin
and noted in the state's administrative code. 8 1 The agency must thereafter
bear the burden of establishing the rule's validity in any subsequent judicial action. 82 The committee's failure to object to a rule does not imply
that it is within the agency's delegated authority. 83 This is intended to
prevent courts from inferring statutory authority for a challenged rule
from the committee's failure to object. To encourage litigation of these
rules, the drafters recommend that whenever a rule is invalidated because
an agency fails to meet its burden of persuasion, the agency should be
84
liable for court costs including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The second optional provision allows the committee to require an
agency to initiate rulemaking if the committee recommends a rule
change. 85 The agency must publish the recommendation as a proposed
rule and conduct public proceedings upon it. After the public proceed-86
ings, however, the agency need not adopt the committee's proposal.
This is intended to help focus political pressure upon agencies and to ensure that they make informed decisions on committee recommendations.87
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE 1981 MODEL ACT APPROACH

The 1981 Model Act contemplates a dual system of nonjudicial review.
This section analyzes the desirability of these provisions and proposes
several modifications to facilitate advisory review and minimize the potential for abuse of this process.
A.

GubernatorialReview: The GubernatorialVeto
The gubernatorial review process created by the 1981 Model Act has

79. Id. § 3-204(d)(1).
80. The agency must respond in writing to the committee within 14 days of the time the objection
is filed. Id. § 3-204(d)(4).
81. Id. § 3-204(d)(3).
82. Id. § 3-204(d)(5).
83. Id. § 3-204(d)(6).
84. The drafters recommend inclusion of a provision at the end of § 3-204(d)(5) providing that
where an agency fails to meet its burden of persuasion a court will: "render judgment against the
agency for court costs. Court costs include a reasonable attorney's fee and are payable by the [state
comptroller] from the support appropriations of the agency that adopted the rule." Id. § 3-204 comments (based upon IOWA CODE § 17A.4(4)(b) (1979)).
85. Id. § 3-204(e).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 3-204 comments.
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several advantages. The process should improve the administrative system by keeping the governor informed of agency rulemaking. This will
enable the governor to supervise regulatory activity and to employ effectively the authority of the chief executive. Nonetheless, the advantages of
the gubernatorial review process are outweighed by its potential to undermine the lawmaking process. The veto provision, which authorizes the
governor to veto the rules of any agency at any time, 88 is too broad and
lacks sufficient safeguards. Allowing the governor to veto the rules of
independent agencies may be unconstitutional. 89 In addition, the governor's power to veto existing agency rules enables each successive governor to unilaterally terminate past policies. 90 This means that a governor
could terminate administrative functions and deregulate industries. The
governor's power is limited only by minimal procedural requirements. 9 1
To avoid this potential dislocation of legislative power, the governor's
veto should be restricted to a limited time period or the legislature should
92
be authorized to overrule the veto by a majority vote.
The executive review provision also contains inadequate public participation safeguards. Although the Act requires public proceedings when
the governor vetoes an existing rule, the governor could avoid public participation under provisions that exempt certain rules from notice and comment. 93 Even where public proceedings occur, they may not influence the
governor's decision. Often, the initial decision will be made in private
94
during consultation with the administrative counsel.
The Act does not mandate public disclosure of oral communications
between the governor's office and the agencies. 95 This problem is exacer88. Id. § 3-202.
89. Id. § 3-202 comments.
90. The drafters noted this problem, but stated that a time limit is undesirable because "a rule
may become unwise or politically unacceptable only in light of changed circumstances occurring long
after its adoption; and the issuing agency may nevertheless refuse to repeal the rule at that later
time." Id.
91. Id. § 3-202(a); see note 60 supra.
92. This is analogous to the "reverse lawmaking" procedure used for executive reorganization
plans, whereby the President's proposals to Congress become law if neither house vetoes them within
a limited period of time. In effect, this reverses the constitutional lawmaking procedure by allowing
the executive to legislate subject to the legislature's veto. See Fleishman & Aufses, Law and Orders:
The Problem ofPresidentialLegislation,40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Summer 1976).
93. 1981 MODEL Acr, supranote5, §§ 3-108,-I15;see note 110 infra.
94. The governor's staff is likely to exercise a critical role in the review process. For example,
the Iowa administrative rules counsel initially reviews all proposed rules and resolves problems
through informal consultation with the agencies. The governor reviews only about five percent of the
rules. Letter from Bruce C. Oakley, Iowa Administrative Counsel, to author (Feb. 24, 1982) (on file
with the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Oakley letter].
95. The Act does not require inclusion of oral ex parte communications to the agency in either
the rulemaking docket or record. See 1981 MODEL Acr, supranote 5, §§ 3-102, -112. A comment
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bated by the informal, consultive nature of the review process. 96 The resulting private negotiations distort the rulemaking record, hinder judicial

review, and undermine administrative accountability. Public participation
also becomes less meaningful because the public will not know the basis

of the governor's decision.
It is questionable whether this veto power should be delegated to the

governor. 97 The governor's veto of agency rules is not subject to effective
public, judicial, or legislative control. Although the governor is politically accountable to the general public, the veto of any specific agency
rule is unlikely to be a significant political issue. 98 Judicial review of gubernatorial vetoes is likely to be deferential and limited to narrow
procedural issues. 99 The absence of statutory criteria and the minimal
must be included in the rulemaking record only when it is transmitted in writing or offered at the
agency's public proceeding. Id.
96. In Iowa, the administrative counsel consults informally with agencies on about 20% of the
rules filed. This informal consultation often proves decisive as most problems are resolved at this
point. The governor has vetoed only eight rules since receiving this power. Oakley letter, supra note
94.
97. The drafters of the Act did not address the desirability of vesting any political body with veto
power over agency rules. The comments to § 3-202 support a gubernatorial veto only as an alternative to the less desirable legislative veto. 1981 MODEL ACT, supra note 5, § 3-202 comments. Nevertheless, many of the criticisms of a legislative veto apply equally to a gubernatorial veto. See notes
119-29 and accompanying text infra.
98. Specific agency rulemaking is usually too little publicized, derivative, and incremental to
influence the public's vote. As a general matter, the voting public often lacks knowledge of the candidates' proposals or past actions. Numerous voting studies conclude that "serious'* issues are usually
a less important factor in elections than candidate charisma, personality, or more generalized goals.
See, e.g.. W. BENNETT. PUBLIC OPINION INAMERICAN POLITICS 356-63 (1980) (voter rationality depends on meaningful issues and situational factors often absent in elections); A. CAMPBELL. P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES. THE AMERICAN VOTER 169-79, 541-48 (1960) (effect of issues
overestimated, public lacks familiarity with issues); B. PAGE. CHOICES AND ECHOES IN PRESIDENTIAL

ELECTIONS 192-265 (1978) (emphasizing candidate's superficial image and personality as factors in
electoral decisions). This problem is exacerbated by the private and informal nature of the review
process.
In addition, many gubernatorial vetoes are unlikely to receive significant media attention. Even
where reported, the veto may be noncontroversial, or the rules themselves esoteric and difficult to
understand. For example, Governor Ray of Iowa has vetoed rules defining "chiropractor." defining
small employment groups for the purpose of credit union membership, prohibiting the use of signs for
dental advertising, and allowing the issuance of prescription drugs by registered nurses. Iowa Admin.
Rules Exec. Orders Nos. 1, 2, 4 & 8. Consequently, Governor Ray's enhanced authority over the
rulemaking process has not become the subject of political controversy in Iowa. Oakley letter. supra
note 94.
99. Because there is no statutory standard for the exercise of the gubernatorial veto, courts can
invalidate it only where the governor vetoes nonseverable parts of rules or fails to comply with the
procedural requirements set forth in § 3-202.
Alternatively, a court could review a governor's veto of a rule under the due process requirements
of the state and federal constitutions. Several federal courts have held that the fourteenth amendment
applies to executive actions that affect substantial private interests. See, e.g., Thompson v. Gallagher. 489 F.2d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 1973) (mayor's discharge of municipal employee unconstitutional where arbitrary and unreasonable); Saffioti v. Wilson, 392 F. Supp. 1335, 1341-43
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procedural restrictions on the use of the veto power will make it difficult
for courts to find an abuse of that power. Legislative supervision of the
governor's veto is similarly unreliable. The legislature may acquiesce in
the governor's action for reasons entirely unrelated to the policy issues
involved. 100 If the legislature overrules the governor by enacting the rules
as a statutory amendment, this-toois-subject-to_ eto-b-ythe-go-vemor. As a
result, a two-thirds majority vote of each house would be necessary to
repeal the governor's action and reinstate the earlier policy.
Not only is the governor's exercise of this authority difficult to monitor, but it is likely that agencies will develop a spirit of compromise when
faced with the veto power and will tailor prospective rules to meet the
governor's requests. Therefore, the true extent and effect of gubernatorial
intervention will often be unknown. In addition, direct gubernatorial intervention may reduce the quality of agency rulemaking by displacing
public participation and agency expertise and- transferring- power to generalists within the governor's office. 10' Finally, the veto increases the
governor's authority and undermines the more formal and representative
lawmaking process. It enables a governor to unilaterally reduce agency
02
discretion and influence directly the implementation of new policies. 1
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff d, 588 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1978) (governor's veto of private bill unconstitutional if arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the court could only invalidate a veto where the governor's decision was completely unsupported by evidence and lacked reasonable justification).
In addition, standing requirements will preclude most attacks on the governor's exercise of the veto
power. As the United States Supreme Court stated for the federal Constitution: "Standing to sue may
not be predicated upon an interest . . which is held in common by all members of the public."
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974).
Finally, a state court could review a governor's veto of a rule under judicial guidelines established
for the governor's item veto power over appropriations bills. See Iowa Administrative Rules Guide
18 (April, 1980). But these guidelines would only reinforce the minimal procedural requirements of §
3-202 and prohibit excising specific parts of a rule to modify the substantive content. Cf. Washington
Ass'n of Apartment Ass'ns v. Evans, 88 Wn.2d 563, 565-66, 564 P.2d 788, 791 (1977) ("excised
portion of [the] bill must constitute an item or section" and "the veto power must be exercised in a
destructive and not a creative manner"). None of these three possibilities provides a satisfactory
judicial check on the governor's actions.
100. For example, the legislature may not be in session, or members may be preoccupied with
reelection campaigns, concerned with present legislation, or seeking to avoid embarrassing the governor. See Gerwitz, The Courts, Congress,and Executive Policy-Making:Notes on Three Doctrines,
40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 44, 78-79 (Summer 1976).
101. See note 96 supra.
102. The veto cannot be limited in practice to a negative check against prospective agency action
as the drafters of the Act intended. See 1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 5, § 3-202 comments. For
example, a governor could threaten to rescind an agency's regulations unless the agency amended
them significantly. Alternatively, a governor could veto proposed rules and suggest acceptable modifications. This occurred in Iowa when Governor Ray vetoed rules defining the professional limits of
student corporal punishment. Governor Ray included in the executive order a set of factors for the
agency to consider in redrafting the rules. Iowa Admin. Rules Exec. Order No. 7. Although it did not
include specific modifications, it did establish criteria for policy formulation. Id.
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Creation of a gubernatorial veto also may be unnecessary. The Act's
regular notice and comment proceedings provide a sufficient method for
stopping the promulgation of unacceptable agency rules and for coordinating regulations. 103 In these proceedings, members of the executive
branch, agencies, and the general public may submit their views on proposed rules to the adopting agencies. 104 Unlike the ex parte communication that the Act allows in the gubernatorial veto process, the notice and
comment communication is incorporated in the rulemaking record, is
subject to public scrutiny, and is available for judicial review. It is therefore more likely to result in effective public participation and judicial review. Moreover, legal but undesirable rules may be rescinded by statutory amendment through the joint action of the legislature and the
executive.
B.

Legislative Review: Advisory Review and the Reversed Burden of
PersuasionMechanism

The legislative review process created by the 1981 Model Act should
improve the administrative system by keeping the legislature informed of
agency rulemaking and by facilitating its supervision of delegated authority. In addition, the Act avoids several of the worst problems of analogous state provisions: undue complexity, use of inappropriate standards
of review, and delegation of excessive power to the committee or legislature.
Undue complexity is best characterized as too much review by too
many people. The review process in some states has grown to include
several levels of review; 105 in others, consultation with standing commit103.

See 1981 MODEL ACT. supra note 5, § 3-104 (provision for public participation). Members

of the executive branch and legislators can also petition the agency for a declaratory order, or intervene in proceedings, to determine the application of a rule to specified circumstances. Id. § 2- 103.
This provides an additional opportunity for members of the executive branch to submit their views on
proposed rules.
104. Id. § 3-104.

105. In Wisconsin, for example, proposed rules are initially submitted to the legislative counsel
staff for advisory technical review. They are then reviewed by a standing committee in each house of
the legislature; if a committee objects, a rule is subsequently reviewed by the joint committee to
review administrative rules. Where the joint committee also objects, it introduces a bill in each house
of the legislature to rescind the rule. These bills may in turn be referred to a standing committee.
Counting the legislature's vote on the bill and the governor's veto power, the rule could be reviewed

six times before its fate is ultimately determined. See Wts STAT ANN §§ 227,018. .029 (West
1982).
In Wyoming, proposed rules are reviewed successively by the legislative counsel office and the
legislative management counsel. The latter reports its findings to the legislature and the governor.
The governor may modify or veto the rule: the legislature may rescind the rule by bill subject to the
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tees; 106 and in still others, simultaneous review by several external bodies. 10 7 The use of repetitious levels of review is misguided because the
formal review process is often circumvented in practice by informal negotiation. 108 By consuming time and scarce resources, it may result in less
administrative action or in more policymaking by adjudication. In contrast, the 1981 Model Act limits the review process to the sixty-day period allowed for a rule's promulgation. 109 This unobtrusive process is less
likely to cause agencies to reduce administrative activity or shift to policymaking by adjudication. If the agency reduces or eliminates this review
period by claiming exemptions from public proceedings, 110 then the Act
requires more intensive judicial review when the rule is challenged rather
than an additional review period. "'1
States employ many diffe-rent standards for legislative review of administrative rulemaking. These standards include deciding whether the
rule follows legislative intent; 12 whether it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; 1 3 and whether the public's need for the rule outweighs its
economic impact.114 Most of these standards share the common problem
governor's veto. Theoretically, a rule could be reviewed six times, three times by the governor alone.
See Wyo. STAT. § 9-4-103(d) & §§ 28-9-104 to -107.
106. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 3.965 (Supp. 1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 817(c) (Supp. 1981).
107. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 17A.4(4)(a) (Supp. 1982) (governor, joint legislative committee
and attorney general all authorized to review rules and file objections); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
84-905.01, -908.02 (Supp. 1980) (all proposed rules reviewed by govbrnor, joint legislative committee, and attorney general).
108. Legislative review committees rarely take formal action. Many problems are resolved informally between the committee staff and the adopting agency before the rules ever reach the committee. When a committee recommends modification or rescission of a proposed rule, the agencies usually comply. Letter from Ruth Goodrich, Clerk to Connecticut Regulations Review Committee, to
author (Jan. 21, 1982) (on file with the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Goodrich letter]; letter from David G. Berger & William J. Rogers, Co-Chairmen of Wisconsin Joint Committee
For Review of Administrative Rules, to author (Jan. 15, 1982) (on file with the Washington Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as Berger & Rogers letter]; Royce, The Rules Review Process in Iowa 15
(October, 1979) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Washington Law Review).
109. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
110. 1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 5, §§ 3-108, -115. Section 3-108 exempts rules from notice
and comment if the agency finds that it is "unnecessary, impracticable, or contrary to the public
interest." Section 3-115 makes rules immediately effective upon filing if the agency finds it is necessary to prevent "imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare."
111. If an agency omits notice and comment proceedings, the rule is subject to de novo review
by the courts. Id. § 3-108. If a rule becomes immediately effective because of public health, safety,
or welfare, the agency has the burden of persuasion on the issue of necessity upon later judicial
review. Id. § 3-115.
112. E.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.087(4) (Baldwin 1981); N.D. CENT. CODa §
54-35-02.6(1) (Supp. 1981); OR. RaV. STAT. § 183.720(3)(b) (1981).
113. E.g., IOWA CODE 17A.4(4)(a) (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-107(h)(1) (Supp. 1981);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 27.018(d)(6) (Supp. 1981).
114. E.g., ALA. CODE § 41-22-23(f)(1)-(5) (Supp. 1981); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11349.1(a)
(West 1979) (OAL review).
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of allowing the state legislative committees unfettered discretion in the
review of policy. "Legislative intent" is often impossible to determine
and thus is an inadequate standard." 5 Judicial standards such as "arbi-

trary and capricious" are inappropriate given the nonjudicial character of
the legislative review process."16 Cost-benefit standards are often inappropriate, especially where rules concern environmental protection or
public and industrial safety. 117 In comparison, the standard for filing objections under the Model Act is narrow and definite. The rule must be
' 18
beyond the adopting agency's "procedural or substantive authority." "
This narrow, objective standard minimizes the committee's ability to deter the adoption of otherwise valid rules for policy reasons.
An increasing number of states authorize their review committees to
suspend agency rules either permanently or pending passage of a bill or

Additionally, a few states have authorized their committees to review rules for form, style or grammar. E.g., FLA STAT § 120.545(l)(d) (Supp. 1981); ILL REv STAT ch. 127, § 1007.05(1) (1981).
These technical problems are better met by granting editing authority to the compiler of the state
administrative bulletin, see, e.g., 1981 MODEL ACT. supra note 5, § 2-101(b); ALASKA STAT §
44.62.125(b)(6), and by circulating rulemaking guides to state agencies.
115. In practice, legislative intent may be impossible to reconstruct accurately given the meager
recorded legislative history in most states. Rarely will legislative intent be found in the subjective
interpretations offered by committee members or other interested legislators. The U.S. Supreme
Court has consistently characterized similar post-hoc statements as unreliable evidence of the intent
behind the original legislation. See, e.g., National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n. v. NLRB. 386 U.S. 612.
639 n.34 (1967); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S. 252, 269 (1965); United States v.
Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960).
Furthermore, many of the problems arising from agency implementation of complex and controversial legislation cannot be resolved by reference to legislative intent. Often, it was the absence of
any such legislative intent that led to the delegation of broad rulemaking powers. The problems were
either unforeseen or a majority of legislators could not agree on how to resolve them.
116. Unlike courts, most committees lack a rulemaking record. In addition, members may lack
legal experience, and the committee's mandate may cause it to assume an adversarial stance to
agency rulemaking. Cf. PRICE, supra note 18, at 14 ("OAL is less deferential to agencies than courts
would be; regulations unlikely to be enjoined-indeed unlikely to be brought to court-are sometimes returned by OAL.").
117. See Berger & Ruskin, Economic and Technological Feasibility in Regulating Toxic Substances Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 285, 287 (1978) (public
disfavors assignment of dollar values to intangibles such as human life, health and comfort); Costle.
Environmental Regulation and Regulatory Reform, 57 WASH. L. REV. 409, 419 (1982) (cost-benefit
analysis of regulations undermines the government's role of intervening when the marketplace has
failed to provide benefits such as environmental protection); Kramer, Economics, Technology, and
the Clean Air Amendments of 1970: The First Six Years, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 161, 165 (1976) (lack of
information and difficulty in establishing proper valuation of social benefits make conclusive costbenefit calculations impossible). In addition, cost-benefit standards may lead to a misallocation of
administrative resources where agencies attempt to forestall review by detailed, comprehensive preliminary analysis.
118. 1981 MODEL ACT, supra note 5, § 3-204(d)(1).
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resolution. 19 Although these additional powers are seldom exercised,1 20
they are unwise nonetheless. These powers allow a handful of legislators
to delay adoption of a legal rule until the full legislature votes on the bill,
which could take more than a year. Faced with this delay, an agency
might modify the rule or otherwise yield to the committee's demands.
These powers also enable the committee to delay the implementation of
legislation where regulations are necessary for the statutes to take effect.
The drafters of the 1981 Model Act properly avoid this danger by not
granting the committee the authority to suspend prospective rules. 121
There has been a recent trend towards state legislatures empowering
themselves with legislative veto capability, enabling them to veto an
agency rule by adopting a one or two house resolution without submitting
it to the governor. 122 Not only is this procedure of questionable constitu-

tionality, 123 it is undesirable. A legislative veto shifts power from inter119. See notes 28-32 and accompanying text supra. This procedure is probably not unconstitutional if the full legislature and the governor must affirm the suspension by passage of a bill of
repealer. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783 (N.H. 1981) (committee suspension pending passage of a bill of repealer "gives proper deference to the full legislative body as well as to the
Governor"). But see 24 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 35 (1977) (legislative repeal of specific agency rule
violates separation of powers doctrine); 63 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 168, 171-72 (1974) (committee
suspension of rule is repeal of law by unconstitutional means).
120. For example, the Connecticut committee disapproved only two rules submitted during
1980. Goodrich letter, supra note 108. The Iowa committee exercised its power to suspend a rule
only five times in three years. IowA ADMINISTRATIVE RULES REvIEW COMMITTEE, ANNUAL REPORT
(1978); IOwA ADMINISTRATIVE RULES REVIEW COMMrrrEE, ANNUAL REPORT (1979); IowA ADMINISTRATIVE RULES REVIEW COMMI'EE, ANNUAL REPORT (1980). The Wisconsin committee exercised its
power to suspend a rule only once during the 1979-80 biennium. Berger & Rogers letter, supra note
108.
121. 1981 MoDEL ACT, supranote 5, § 3-204(c); see note 72 supra.
122. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
123. One federal circuit court and three state supreme courts have held that legislative veto of
agency regulation schemes are unconstitutional. See Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, noted in
51 U.S.L.W. 2262 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 22, 1982) (en banc) (two-house legislative veto violates federal
doctrine of separation of powers and constitutional requirement of presentation to President; may also
be an undue delegation of legislative power); Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d
425 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (one-house legislative veto violates federal doctrine of separation of powers and
constitutional requirements of bicameral lawmaking and presentation to President, and may be an
undue delegation of legislative power), petitionfor cert. filed sub nom. Interstate Nat'l Gas Ass'n of
Am. v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 50 U.S.L.W. 3896 (U.S. May 11, 1982) (No. 81-2020);
Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783 (N.H. 1981) (one house veto violates state constitutional
requirements of bicameral action by majority of both legislative houses and presentation to executive); Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981) (one house veto violates state separation of
powers doctrine and state constitutional requirements of bicameral action lawmaking and presentation to executive); State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980) (legislative veto
scheme violates state constitutional requirements of legislation by bill and presentation to executive).
Two other recent federal cases have considered the constitutionality of a congressional veto over
nonregulatory executive action. See Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408,
420-36 (9th Cir. 1980) (one house veto of attorney general's suspension of deportation order violates
separation of powers doctrine), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 87 (1981); Atkins v. United States, 556
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ested members of the public and from experienced agencies to generalists

in the legislature or on the committee staff. It therefore may reduce the
quality of agency rulemaking. It also may cause agencies to implement
controversial regulatory policies by adjudication, 124 an inappropriate
25
method for major policy decisions. 1
In addition, veto mechanisms are susceptible to abuse by powerful legislators with parochial interests and by influential interest groups acting
contrary to the public interest. 126 Because of the informal nature of this
process 127 and the tendency of agencies to accede to committee requests, 128 abuse will be difficult to detect or remedy. Legislative vetoes
also facilitate over-involvement by the legislature in the daily administration of agency programs, and allow the committee or legislature acting
alone to narrow the scope of agency discretion. This subverts the more
F.2d 1028, 1057-71 (Ct. CI. 1977) (per curiam) (en banc) (one house veto of President's salary
recommendations authorized by necessary and proper clause). cert. denied. 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
Both courts distinguished their holdings from the usual situation of agency rulemaking. Compare id.
at 1059 (President's salary proposals "do not order or regulate any person, either actually or potentially") with Chadha, 634 F.2d at 433 (agencies' broad rulemaking authority would present different
considerations "as to the question of separation of powers and the legitimacy of the unicameral device").
Several states have attempted to circumvent these problems by careful drafting. See. e.g., GA.
CODE § 3A-104(f) (Supp. 1981) (two house resolution subject to gubernatorial veto if less than twothirds majority); IOWA CODE § 17A.8(9) (Supp. 1981) (two house resolution subject to gubernatorial
veto). Other states have amended their constitutions to authorize the legislature to veto agency rules.
See, e.g., MICHIGAN CONST. art. IV, § 37: SOUTH DAKOTA CONST. art. III.
§ 30.
124. Excluding the OAL. discussed in note 18 supra, there is no quantitative evidence that adoption of a legislative veto has decreased rulemaking by state agencies. Quantitative statistics are inconclusive on this issue, however, for they do not adequately reflect agencies' implementation of specific
controversial policies by adjudication.
125. See note 50 supra.
126. See notes 130-32 and accompanying text infra.
127.

See. e.g., IOWA ADMINISTRATIVE RULES REVIEW COMMITrEE, ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1979):

"As agencies, the public]] and the committee become more familiar with one another it is becoming
apparent that a spirit of compromise is growing and negotiation is replacing objection." See also note
128 and accompanying text infra. Often, problems are resolved between the staff and agencies before
a rule reaches the committee. Letter from Bruce A. Johnson, Executive Director of Illinois Joint
Committee on Administrative Rules, to author (Jan. 25, 1982) (on file with the Washington Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as Johnson letter]; Letter from Richard H. Miller, Research Assistant to
Wyoming Legislative Service Office, to author (Jan. 4, 1982) (on file with the Washington Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as Miller letter].
128. Agencies usually withdraw or modify rules to meet committee objections. Letter from
Kathleen P. Burek, Executive Director of Minnesota Legislative Committee to Review Administrative Rules, to author (Feb. 9, 1982) (on file with the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter cited as
Burek letter]; Letter from Winston L. Page, Jr., Staff Attorney to North Carolina Administrative
Rules Review Committee, to author (Jan. 15, 1982) (on file with the Washington Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as Page letter]; Letter from Jay E. Buringrud, Code Reviser for North Dakota Legislature Council, to author (Jan. 11, 1982) (on file with the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as Buringrud letter]; Letter from David S. Niss, Counsel to Montana Administrative Code Committee, to author (Jan. 21, 1982) (on file with the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Niss
letter]; Miller letter, supra note 127; Berger & Rogers letter, supra note 108.
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representative and formal statutory process, with its built-in checks and
balances. 129 Finally, by avoiding the governor's veto, legislative vetoes
reduce the governor's authority and bargaining power with the legislature.
Alaska's attempt to control oil spills provides an example of these dangers.130 In 1977, the Alaska legislature passed a statute authorizing the
state department of environmental conservation to prepare regulations establishing a schedule of civil penalties for the discharge of oil.13 ' The
statute was inoperative until the regulations were promulgated. After several oil suppliers expressed strong opposition to the underlying statute,
the administrative regulations review committee opposed the regulations.
The committee used its power to recommend annulment to force the governor to accept an amendment that exempted discharges of 5,000 barrels
of oil. This was subsequently increased to 18,000 barrels before the
amendment passed. The governor could not prevent the exemption without risking legislative invalidation of the statute by concurrent resolu-

tion. 132
In comparison with these more extreme powers, the 1981 Model Act
wisely limits the committee to advisory authority and to the optional
mechanism of reversing the burden of persuasion. Advisory review is
constitutional, relatively quick, and efficient. Agencies usually agree to
modify their rules 33 and the recommended statutes are usual ly
adopted. 134 The committee's authority is limited to the persuasive appeal
of its arguments, as indirectly supported by the legislature's power of
statutory amendment, appropriations, and investigations.
129. The importance of the checks and balances of the constitutional lawmaking system was
recently illustrated in Washington state. The Washington legislature, reacting to the current economic
slump, passed legislation amending the state's Shoreline Management Act to allow an oil refinery to
be built in a protected area. S. 4831, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1982). Governor Spellman vetoed the
legislation, and the legislature failed to override his decision. A legislative veto would have excluded
Governor Spellman from the decisionmaking process and the slim legislative majority would have
been successful. Seattle Times, Apr. 4, 1982, at Al, col. 1.
130. For other examples of the apparent abuse of legislative veto provisions in response to legislative and interest group pressures see N.Y. STUDY, supra note 26, at 4-5.
131. 1977 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 129, § I (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.758
(Supp. 1981)).
132. Deputy Attorney General Jonathan K. Tillinghast later recounted: "Tihe administration
had little choice but to accept the exemption for 18,000 gallonsf,] [as] the only alternative available . . . would be to see the entire law vitiated by concurrent resolution of the Legislature." Reply
Brief for Appellant, Attachment E, State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980)
(affidavit of Jonathan K. Tillinghast).
133. See note 128 supra.
134. See Burek letter, supra note 128; Page letter, supra note 128; Buringrud letter, supra note
128; Johnson letter, supra note 127; Miller letter, supra note 127; Berger & Rogers letter, supra note
108.
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Advisory powers alone, however, may not provide the committee with
sufficient authority to deter the promulgation of illegal rules. 135 For this
reason the Act includes an optional provision that reverses the burden of
persuasion. 136 This provision delegates the legislature's power to allocate
the burden of persuasion to the committee, but leaves the ultimate determination of a rule's legality to the courts. Thus, when the committee is
wrong, the agency will be able to prove that the rule is within its authority
and the rule will be upheld.
In practice, the greatest value of this mechanism is likely to be the
added weight it gives to the committee's recommendations. 137 The combination of advisory review and this ability to reverse the burden of persuasion is superior to committee suspensions and legislative vetoes. It
avoids the legal and practical problems posed by these more extreme
powers.1 38 This combination should decrease illegal rulemaking and result in a more informed legislature.
Although the committee review process authorized by the Act is generally superior to analogous state systems, some of its provisions need improvement. First, the Act directs the committee to "selectively review"
agency rules. 139 This corresponds to the actual practice in most states,
where the staff initially selects rules for more intensive review by the
committee.1 40 This approach frees the committee from the burdensome
task of intensively reviewing all proposed and existing agency rules. This
approach, however, might result in staffs using random spot checking of
135.

The N.Y. Study concluded that most questionable rules result from honest mistakes or dif-

ferences of opinion and that agencies are generally cooperative. N.Y. STUDY. supra note 26, at 4.
This conclusion is shared by committee staff from some states where the committee lacks suspensory
or veto powers. Buringrud letter, supra note 128; Niss letter. supra note 128. Other observers. how-

ever, report that agencies became more responsive when the legislature or committee received additional powers. Johnson letter, supra note 127. In practice, additional committee powers may be less
important than an adequate budget and staff and support from the executive branch.
136.

1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 5. § 3-204(d)(5). This mechanism should survive judicial

review. It includes a narrow and reasonable statutory standard. The Iowa Supreme Court has tacitly
accepted the constitutionality of this procedure by applying the reversed burden of persuasion in two
cases. See Iowa Dealers Ass'n v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue, 301 N.W.2d 760 (Iowa 1981) (agency met
its burden and the court upheld the rule); Schmitt v. Iowa Dept. of Social Serv., 263 N.W.2d 739

(Iowa 1978) (agency failed to meet the committee-imposed burden of persuasion and the court invalidated a rule).
137. Although the Iowa committee initially issued frequent objections, it now seldom exercises
this power and relies instead upon advisory review. Between July 1975 and January 1977, the com-

mittee voted 74 objections; this number dropped to 36 in 1977, to 23 in 1978, and to 13 in 1979.
IOWA ADMINISTRATIVE RULES REVIEW COMMITTEE, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1979). The trend continued in
1980 with the committee voting only six objections. IOWA ADMINISTRATIVE RULES REVIEW COMMITTEE, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1980).
138. See notes 119-32 and accompanying text supra.
139. 1981 MODEL Acr. supra note 5, § 3-204(a).
140. Niss letter, supra note 128; Johnson letter, supra note 127; Berger & Rogers letter, supra
note 108; Royce letter. supra note 71.
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rules or omitting entire agencies from review. A more desirable approach
would involve the systematic review of all proposed rules to exploit fully
the committee's advisory and curative powers.
Second, the Act does not set standards to restrict the committee's advisory review but instead allows the committee to focus on policy, costs, or
the interests of the members or staff. 141 Allowing the committee to advise
agencies on regulatory policy is unwise for several reasons. To the extent
that an agency acquiesces in the committee's policy recommendations,
public participation and agency expertise are displaced. This completely
discretionary review expands the range of the committee's authority. Expansion is undesirable because the committee's recommendations may reflect the views of only the committee and its staff. 142 This increases the
danger of reallocating power back to a small and unrepresentative body.
Moreover, this may encourage the committee to attempt to function as a
"supereagency" directing policy on an ad hoc basis. The committee lacks
the resources, expertise, and independence to perform such a role adequately.
Third, under the Act the committee's unwritten communications to
agencies are subject to neither public nor judicial scrutiny. 143 This reduces committee accountability, weakens public participation, and increases the opportunities for misuse of power. In recent years, federal
courts have invalidated agency decisions because of undisclosed ex parte
communications between interested parties. 144 These problems could easily be avoided by requiring that all significant committee communications
be included in the rulemaking docket and record.
Fourth, the Act does not require new notice and comment proceedings
after an agency significantly modifies a proposed rule in response to a
formal objection. Although omitting a second series of public proceedings may save time, it enables an agency to adopt what is essentially a
new rule without public participation. To avoid this result, the Act should
require that agencies conduct new notice and comment proceedings after
they substantially modify and readopt rules pursuant to a committee ob45
jection. 1
141. See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
142. Staff recommendations are usually followed by the committee members, who may lack the
time and expertise for independent judgments. Niss letter, supranote 128; Johnson letter, supranote
127; Berger& Rogers letter, supranote 108; Royce letter, supranote 71.
143. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
144. See United States Lines v. FMC, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Home Box Office v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978). But see Sierra Club v.
Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 404-08 (1981) (upholding rule despite undocketed ex parte contacts by the
President and members of the White House staff).
145. Substantial modifications could be defined as nongrammatical, nontechnical, i.e., substantive, changes in proposed rules.
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Fifth, the Act does not adequately prevent the committee's review from
inadvertently influencing the subsequent judicial review of a rule. 146 Although the Act properly prohibits courts from interpreting the committee's failure to object to a rule as evidence that the rule is within the
agency's powers, 147 this prohibition does not apply to the committee's
advisory powers.1 48 A court could construe legislative inaction coupled
with systematic advisory review as evidence of a rule's validity. 149 This
assumption is unwarranted. Legislative inaction may result from time
constraints, insufficient staffing, or errors in the review process. To avoid
this danger, the Act should forbid any judicial inference from committee
inactivity. 150
C.

A Recommended Approachfor the States

Nonjudicial review of agency rules usually leads to private consultation
and informal compromise. 15 1 Review is conducted by generalists who
lack expertise in particular areas of regulatory activity. Staff recommendations are often decisive. 152 These problems limit the desirability of the
more extreme forms of nonjudicial review. They suggest that executive
and legislative bodies reviewing agency rules should operate as inter146. Several courts have construed inaction by the legislature or committee as evidence that a
rule is within an agency's delegated authority. See, e.g., Fredericks v. Kreps, 578 F.2d 555. 563 (5th
Cir. 1978); Jax Liquors v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 388 So.2d 1306, 1308 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); D'Anna v. Secretary of Personnel, 47 Md. App. 180, 422 A.2d 50.52 (1980):
State ex rel. Dept. of Health & Environmental Serv. v. Lincoln County, 584 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Mont.
1978). But see Ware v. Idaho State Tax Comm., 98 Idaho 477, 567 P.2d 423. 427 (1977) (rule
invalid despite legislative inaction); Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Welch, 446 P.2d
268, 270 (Okla. 1968) (same).
Often "legislative inaction" is a makeweight argument to uphold a challenged rule on other
grounds. For example, in Lincoln County the court also found the rule supported by both specific
statutory provisions and the statutory scheme. 584 P.2d at 1295. One court, however, has stated:
"When the Legislature charges itself directly . . . to review each regulation as enacted . . . [for]

possible conflicts with its own [statutory scheme] . . . we must infer that the AELR [legislativel
committee has performed its statutory responsibility. In the absence of critical comment, a legal
presumption arises that the regulation does not conflict." D'Anna v. Secretary of Personnel. 422
A.2d at 52.
147. 1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 5, § 3-204(d)(6).
148. The prohibition against judicial inference is limited to the absence of a committee objection.
and is incorporated only within optional subsection (d). Id.
149. See Fredericks v. Kreps, 578 F.2d 555, 563 (5th Cir. 1978) (interpreting inaction by a
legislative oversight committee with only advisory powers as evidence of a rule's validity); D'Anna
v. Secretary of Personnel, 47 Md. App. 180, 422 A.2d 50, 52 (1980) (same).
150. To accomplish this, states should adopt a provision similar to MONT. CODE ANN. §
2-4-412(4) (1981): "Failure of the legislature or the administrative code committee to object in any
manner to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule is inadmissible in the court of this state to
prove the validity of any rule."
151. See notes 96 & 127 and accompanying text supra.
152. See notes 94 & 142 and accompanying text supra.
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governmental ombudsmen-dispensing advice, monitoring agency activity, and transmitting information-rather than as mini-legislatures or
"super-agencies." The process of formal review should work to improve, rather than supplant, executive and legislative oversight of agency
rulemaking.
To facilitate this role, the reviewing body 53 should review all rules
promptly. In addition, agencies should be encouraged to consult with the
reviewing body before promulgating rules. This should aid in the identification and correction of deviations from procedural and substantive requirements, which will make it easier to implement rules and should reduce the possibility of subsequent invalidation by the courts..
The reviewing body also should be restricted to offering only legal advice. This should deter it from attempting to operate as a "superagency," a role it lacks the resources, expertise, and independence to
perform. It also minimizes potential abuse by special interests and powerful politicians. The limitation is necessary because agencies are likely to
attribute undue weight to committee suggestions. Policy recommendations should be channeled instead through the regular notice and comment
proceedings by interested members of the legislature and executive
branch.
The reviewing body should have only minimal authority. Although
special powers to suspend or veto rules are seldom exercised, 154 they may
influence agency rulemaking. They are also subject to misuse, and subvert the more representative and formal lawmaking process. Undesirable
rules should be modified or rescinded only through the use of statutory
amendments that involve the joint action of the legislature and the execu-

tive. 155
Furthermore, the reviewing body's communications to agencies should
be disclosed to the public and be available for later judicial review. This
reduces the opportunities for misuse of power associated with secret communications, makes public participation more meaningful, and improves
the quality of judicial review. Its importance is increased by the informal,
advisory nature of the review process. It imposes no extra procedural bur153. The reviewing body could be either an executive officer, an executive agency, or a legislative committee. Because the staff usually performs the most important review, there may be little
practical difference between a legislative committee and an executive agency. States should carefully
consider, however, which body will attract more support from the governor and legislature and have
greater credibility with the agencies.
A successful system of nonjudicial review will also require a sufficient staff and budget. If these
latter elements are absent, review will be far less intensive. This has occurred in North Dakota where
the legislative committee has only partial access to a single staff member. Consequently, "few rules
are reviewed in depth." Buringrud letter, supra note 128.
154. See note 120 supra.
155. See 1981 MODEL Acr, supra note 5, § 3-204 comments.
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den where agencies are already required to maintain a rulemaking docket
and record.
Finally, the reviewing body should freely transmit information to the
governor and legislature. Adequate information on agency rulemaking
and administrative activity is a necessary prerequisite to effective use of
the various legislative and executive controls. 156 Inclusion of a legislative
committee and executive counsel to review rulemaking in the 1981 Model
Act underscores the importance of this factor.
Review by a special agency, officer, or committee that incorporates
these elements should provide a systematic, expeditious, and relatively
inexpensive review of agency rules before they reach the public. It should
improve legislative and gubernatorial oversight of agency rulemaking and
administrative activity. It should also minimize the potential for abuse by
special interests and powerful politicians.
V.

CONCLUSION

The optional gubernatorial and legislative review provisions in the
1981 Model Act address important problems in the administrative process. The gubernatorial veto provision is unwise due to the private, informal nature of the review process and the lack of accountability. The legislative review provision is preferable and superior to all the analagous state
provisions. It could be improved, however, by circumscribing the committee's power to advise agencies on regulatory policy and by requiring
inclusion of committee communications in the rulemaking docket and
record.
David S. Neslin

156. "'it
is only through adequate information that the problems and practices of administrative
agencies can be understood and dealt with effectively," Howe, Legislative Review of Administrative
Rules. in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION: 1955-56 167. 173 (1957).
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